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ConstitutionalCourts in East Asia

Constitutional Courts in East Asia:
Understanding Variation
TOM GINSBURG *

After decades of authoritarian rule, East Asia has experienced a wave of democratization
since the mid-1980s. Transitions toward more open political structures have been effectuated
in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Mongolia and Indonesia, and even the Leninist states of
China and Vietnam have experienced tentative moves toward more participatory politics.'
These political transitions have been accompanied by an important but understudied
phenomenon: the emergence of powerful constitutional courts in the region. In at least four
countries, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea and Mongolia, constitutional courts created
during the democratic transition have emerged as real constraints on political authority.
A fifth court, the Council of Grand Justices in Taiwan, re-awakened after years of relative
quiet to play an important role in Taiwan's long political transition to democracy.
Given the cultural and political history of the region, this is a phenomenon that might
be seen as surprising. After all, most political systems in the region had until the 1980s
were dominated by powerful executives without effective judicial constraint. The political
systems of non-Communist Asia involved varying degrees of "authoritarian pluralism,"
wherein a certain degree of political openness was allowed to the extent it did not challenge
authoritarian rule.2 Thus there was little precedent for active courts protecting rights or
interfering with state action.
Furthermore, traditional perspectives on Asian governance, resuscitated by proponents
of "Asian values," have tended to view political culture in East Asia as emphasizing
responsibilities over rights and social order over individual autonomy.3 Both Buddhist
and Confucian religious traditions emphasize the ideal of concentrating power in a
single righteous ruler (the Buddhist dhammaraja or the Emperor enjoying the Mandate
of Heaven) rather than establishing multiple seats of competing power and authority as a

* University of Chicago Law School
1 Balme S and Sidel, M (eds) (2007) Vietnam's New Order,Palgrave Macmillan.
2 Scalapino, R (1997) 'A Tale of Three Systems' 8(3) Journal of Democracy 150.
3 Jacobsen, M (2000) Human Rights and Asian Values, RoutledgeCurzon; Mahbubani, K (2002) Can Asians
Think? Steerforth Press; Davis, M (1998) 'The Price of Rights: Constitutionalism and East Asian Economic
Development' 20 Human Rights Quarterly 303; Bell, DA (2000) East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in
Asia, Princeton University Press; Bauer, JR and Bell, DA (eds) (1998) The EastAsian Challengefor Human Rights,
Cambridge University Press.
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means of effective governance. 4 These traditional images of a single righteous leader have
been exploited by rulers in the region, from Ho Chi Minh to Chiang Ching-kuo, usually to
justify and perpetuate authoritarian rule.
Although the extent of the new constitutional constraint varies across countries and
issue areas, it seems apparent that the phenomenon is real and lasting. It is appropriate,
even at this early juncture, to take stock of the phenomenon from a comparative
perspective to determine what factors might explain the emergence of and success of
constitutional review in East Asia. This paper focuses on four courts: the Constitutional
Courts of Thailand, South Korea, Mongolia and the Council of Grand Justices on Taiwan.'
We briefly describe the emergence of each court. We then analyze institutional design
and court performance in comparative perspective. Finally we consider several possible
factors that might help explain the emergence of effective constitutional constraint by
courts. It is hoped that this exercise, consistently with the purpose of this special issue,
might help contribute to the development of broader comparative theories to understand
judicial review and its role in democratization.
THE EMERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA
Traditional Asian political thought provides few resources for developing an indigenous
theory of judicial review of legislation.' Most East Asian societies had some influence
from the imperial Chinese tradition, in which judicial and executive functions were not
separated and all power emanated from a single figure at the center of the political system.
Even in systems where power and authority were separated, as in Japan, the notion of an
independent constraint on power was absent in traditional politics.
The strong history of centralized political authority throughout the region has continued
in the twentieth century, and many have connected Asian authoritarianism with more
general notions of political culture, arguing that there was a strong resonance between
classical political traditions and the modern systems of one party, or one-and-a-half party,
a form of governance that was remarkably consistent from Japan to Indonesia! In South
Korea, a series of military-authoritarian regimes governed, with one brief interlude in
1961, from the end of Japanese colonialism through 1987. In Taiwan, the Kuomintang
(KMT) relied on traditional Chinese notions of government as modified by Sun Yat-sen's
political thought to legitimize a quasi-Leninist authoritarian party regime. Thailand
experienced a cycle of alternating periods of corrupt civilian and military government.
Mongolia had a governmental structure parallel to that of the Soviet Union, headed by a
classically Leninist party. In all four countries, a meritocratically selected state apparatus

The situation is of course a bit more complicated than this characterization would suggest. In classical
Confucianism, particularly as manifested in Korea rather than post-Ming China, advisors to the emperor
exercised significant authority and can be seen as a competing power center. See Palais, J (1975) Politics and
Policy in TraditionalKorea Harvard University Press. In classical Buddhist thought, the wheel of power was
also to be constrained by the wheel of dharma,so the sangha might serve as an alternative power center to state
authority.
Indonesia and Thailand are compared in the article by Harding and Leyland in this issue.
6 Ginsburg, T (2002) 'Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Judicial Review in Korea and Taiwan'
27(4) Law and Social Inquiry 763; Ginsburg, T (2003) JudicialReview in New Democracies:Constitutional Courts in
Asian Cases Cambridge University Press.
I Pye, L (1995) Asian Power and Politics: the Cultural Dimensions ofAuthority Harvard University Press.
4
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provided continuity and exercised much influence, though of course the precise extent of
that influence in the capitalist economies is an issue subject to intense controversy.8
Judicial review in East Asia was similarly constrained, even though it formally existed
in many systems. Only the Philippine Supreme Court can be seen as exercising review
with regularity. The Japanese Supreme Court has been constrained by the long rule of
the Liberal Democratic Party and has issued only eight decisions on unconstitutionality of
legislation.9 In other countries, including Malaysia, Korea and Taiwan, judicial efforts to
constrain the state were met with harsh attacks on the courts.
Beginning in the 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s, a global wave of democratization
and political liberalization led to significant changes in East Asia and beyond. In many
countries, this was accompanied by a shift away from traditional notions of parliamentary
sovereignty toward the idea of constitutional constraint by expert courts. The causes
were complex, and the pressures were global in character. The next section describes the
constitutional courts under consideration in more detail.
Taiwan
Taiwan continues to be governed under an amended version of the 1947 Constitution of
the Republic of China (ROC) adopted in Nanjing. This Constitution, which nominally
governed all of China, was emasculated for many years through the use of so-called
"Temporary Provisions" that legitimated one-party government by the KMT. Democratic
transition in Taiwan began in earnest only in the mid-1980s, when President Chiang
Ching-kuo announced reforms and tolerated the creation of the opposition Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP). After Chiang's death, Taiwan-born President Lee Teng-hui
presided over a long and complex democratic transition, culminating in the election of
DPP leader Chen Shui-bian as President in 2001.
The power of judicial review formally existed throughout this period, to be exercised
by the Council of Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan. Under the 1947 Constitution, the
Council was composed of seventeen members who were appointed by the President with
approval of the Control Yuan (a separate branch of Government) for renewable nineyear terms.10 Constitutional amendments have lowered the number of Grand Justices to
fifteen, shortened the terms to eight years, transferred approval power to the legislature,
and provided for staggered appointments that coincide with the four-year presidential
election cycle.n These amendments also assigned the power to declare political parties
unconstitutional to the Council of Grand Justices, removing regulation of parties from the

Gownder, JP and Pekkanen, R (1996) 'The End of Political Science? Rational Choice Analyses in Studies of
Japanese Politics' 22 Journal ofJapanese Studies 363; Johnson, C (1982) MITI and the JapaneseMiracle Stanford
University Press; Rosenbluth, F (1989) Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan Columbia University Press;
Kernell, S (ed.) (1991) ParallelPolitics:Economic Policymakingin Japanand the United States Brookings Institution.
9 Ramseyer, JM and Rasmusen, EB (2003). MeasuringJudicialIndependence University of Chicago Press; Beer, L
and Maki J (2000) The ConstitutionalCase Law ofJapan University of Washington Press.
10 Although Article 81 of the Constitution grants 'judges' life tenure, the Grand Justices are not considered to
fall into that category.
11Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China, Article 5. The Article also provides that the
Judicial Yuan's draft budget may not be eliminated or reduced by the Executive Yuan in their submission of the
budget to the Legislative Yuan.
8
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executive branch. The Council's primary functions are to issue uniform interpretations of
law and to interpret the Constitution upon request from litigants or government agencies. 12
After some early efforts to constrain the exercise of political power by government, the
Grand Justices were punished by the legislature in the late 1950s. The legislature raised the
voting threshold to issue constitutional interpretations and restricted interpretations to
the constitutional text. From then until the recent liberalization, the Justices were cautious.
Indeed, in the early era, the Council can be seen as an instrument of the KMT regime.
It never accepted a case on the (dubious) constitutionality of the Temporary Provisions,
which were the basis of authoritarian rule. The Temporary Provisions suspended the
two-term limitation for the presidency and allowed the president to govern through
decree powers without legislative approval.13 The Council declined to hear challenges
to these Provisions, and issued a number of decisions that facilitated KMT rule within
the confines of at least nominal constitutionalism. Most prominently, it issued a decision
suspending elections to the National Assembly during the "national emergency", so that
representatives elected on the mainland in 1948 to represent all of China continued to
serve in power for several decades.
After the election of Lee Teng-hui in 1987, however, the Council gradually became
more active.14 It began to strike administrative actions that were vague or delegated too
much power to the executive branch. In 1990, the Council was called on to rule on the
constitutionality of the continued sitting in the National Assembly of members elected on
the mainland in 1948. These members had become a major obstacle to reform since the
Assembly was the body solely responsible for constitutional amendment. The Assembly
thus had an effective veto over efforts to abolish it, as well as to undertake other institutional
reforms desired by the reformers.
Council Interpretation No. 261, announced on June 21, 1990, called for new elections
and forced the retirement of the decrepit old guard of the KMT. This was undoubtedly
the most important case in the history of the Council of Grand Justices and removed the
last legal barrier to rapid institutional reform in Taiwan. Without this decision of the
Grand Justices, the democratization process would have remained at a standstill, with
the possible consequence that then-President Lee Teng-hui would never have cultivated
his strong position within the KMT, and reform would have been delayed indefinitely.
Following the decision, several stages of constitutional amendments transformed the
governmental structure of Taiwan to be more effective, only nominally retaining the fiction
of governing all China.
After appointment of a new set of Grand Justices in 1994, the Council became more
active in striking legislation and constraining executive authority. Many of the new
Justices were Taiwan-born and thus more likely to share Lee Teng-hui's vision of an

Under the 1947 Constitution there are five branches of government (yuan), three corresponding to the
Montesquieuan framework and two drawn from the Chinese imperial tradition, the Control Yuan for audit and
the Examination Yuan for entry into the civil service.
13 'Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion'. These were adopted in 1948
at the first meeting of the First National Assembly in Nanjing, and came into effect on May 10 of that year. For
a discussion of the constitutionality of the Temporary Provisions, see Mendel, FF (1993) 'Judicial Power and
Illusion: The Republic of China's Council of Grand Justices and Constitutional Interpretation' Pacific Rim Law
and Policy Journal2: 157-89.
14 See generally Ginsburg (2003), supra note 6, at ch. 5.
12
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independent Taiwan. They systematically dismantled the quasi-Leninist system of KMT
control, for example by ending the ban on rallies advocating secessionism or communism
as a violation of free speech; allowing universities to refuse to allow military "counselors,"
whose presence in dorms had formerly been mandatory; and allowing teachers to form a
union outside the "official" union structure.
The Council has also played a major role in introducing international norms of criminal
procedure into Taiwan, forcing a complete revision of the Criminal Procedure Code. It
struck provisions of an anti-hooligan law that had reduced procedural protections for
those designated by police as hooligans, and when the legislature modified the statute in
question, the court demanded further revisions. It has also constrained both police and
prosecutors in significant ways.
The Council has been involved in political controversies as well. After the election of
the DPP's Chen Shui-bian as President in 2001, the Council embarrassed his government by
preventing it from halting construction of a major nuclear power plant. It also was thrust
in the center of political controversy when President Lee Teng-hui sought to retain VicePresident Lien Chan as "acting prime minister" after the 1997 presidential election. The
legislature had protested this as a violation of the Constitution. Although the Constitution
does not clearly state that the Vice-President cannot serve as Prime Minister, the Council
found that this was not consistent with the spirit of the Constitution. It thus allowed
Lien to retain office, though a few months later his government was removed for political
reasons.
Constitutional amendments in 1992 provided for the Council of Grand Justices to hear
(sitting as a Constitutional Court) challenges against "unconstitutional" political parties,
defined as those whose "goals or activities jeopardize the existence of the ROC or a free
democratic constitutional order." These clauses were thinly targeted at the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), particularly its pro-independence factions that would eliminate
the ROC and declare a new state of Taiwan which would no longer claim to be the titular
government of all of China. The transfer of the power of regulating political parties to the
Grand Justices reflects continuing German influence in Taiwan's constitutional law,15 and
was seen as progressive in that it took the determination of party unconstitutionality away
from an Executive Yuan "Political Party Screening Committee," which had the previous
January agreed to punish the DPP for its pro-independence plank. Giving this power to
the Council is an important step in the Taiwan context.
The Council has thus been active in using the power of judicial review to strike
legislation and administrative action. It has served as an instrument of democratization,
both by giving life to the constitutional text and elaborating on the text in accordance with
the constitutional spirit and international norms. It has also become involved in major
controversies of a political character, though it has thus far avoided any major attacks
on its powers. It is an exemplar of the role a constitutional court can play in facilitating
democratization.

15 Under the German Basic Law, the Constitutional Court also has the power to disband political parties
that 'seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order'. Basic Law, Article 21. Kommers, D (1997) The
ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof the Federal Republic of Germany (2d ed) Duke University Press, at 223-29.
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South Korea
South Korea's last military regime, headed by Chun Doo-hwan, took power in a coup in
1979. In part because of a massacre of hundreds of non-violent protestors at Kwangju in
May 1980, 16 the government enjoyed little legitimacy, and opposition politicians demanded
that the regime allow direct elections and liberalization. The Korean democratization
process began in earnest in 1986, when widespread demonstrations involving the middle
class led military dictator Chun Doo-hwan to resign the Presidency. His successor, former
general Roh Tae-woo, gave in to opposition demands for a directly elected presidency and
oversaw a process of political negotiation that produced the 1987 Constitution.
One of the central features of this Constitution was the design of a new Constitutional
Court, roughly along the lines of the German model. The Court is composed of 9 members
who serve renewable six-year terms, with 3 members each nominated by the President,
National Assembly and Supreme Court. I characterize this appointment method as
"representative" because each institution has the ability to pick its nominees unimpeded.
The Court has the power to consider the constitutionality of legislation or administrative
action at the request of political bodies or a court, can resolve competence disputes among
governmental institutions, and can respond to constitutional complaints from citizens if
fundamental rights have been abused by government action or omission, or if an ordinary
court fails to refer a constitutional question to the Constitutional Court.
Although earlier Korean Republics had formal provisions for judicial review,
oscillating between centralized and decentralized models, judicial review in Korea
had never effectively served to constrain the state. In the early 1960s, a Supreme Court
decision striking a legislative act upset President Park Chung-hee, who shortly afterwards
moved to concentrate his authority in the so-called Yushin Constitution of 1972. After
these reforms, Park fired all the judges who had voted against his position in the earlier
case. Constitutional review power under the Yushin Constitution was centralized in a
Constitutional Council that remained dormant. It is thus not surprising that most observers
of the 1987 constitutional reforms did not expect the Korean Constitutional Court to play
a major role in the society.17
However, the Court has surprised these observers by regularly overturning legislation
and administrative action." Indeed, in its very first case, it struck as a violation of the
equality principle of the Constitution a law providing that held that the State could not
be subject to preliminary attachment orders in civil cases. The Court insisted that equality
under the law requires treating the state no differently than a private citizen or corporation.
In doing so it challenged the philosophical underpinnings of the postwar Korean political
economy, wherein the state played a major role in directing private economic activity.
One sign of the Court's boldness has been its willingness to create new rights by reading
the text of the constitutional document quite broadly. For example, in 1989 the Court

The precise facts of the incident are hotly disputed, including the number of dead, estimates of which range
between the official figure of 191 up to 2000.
17 Ginsburg, supra note 6, at ch. 7.
18
West, J and Yoon, DK (1992) 'The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea: Transforming the
Jurisprudence of the Vortex' 40 American Journal of Comparative Law 73; Yang, K (1993) 'Judicial Review and
Social Change in the Korean Democratizing Process' 41 American Journal of ComparativeLaw 1; Ahn, KW (1998)
'The Influence of American Constitutionalism on South Korea' 27 Southern Illinois Law Journal 71.
16
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found an implied 'right to know' based on several clauses of the Constitution, echoing
Japanese constitutional case law. It subsequently strengthened that provision by referring
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1991, the Constitutional Court read
Article 10 of the Korean Constitution, which grants citizens a right to pursue happiness,
to encompass a right to freedom of contract. 9 Again, this is fairly radical in the formerly
dirigiste Korean context.
The Court has also been involved in sensitive political issues. For example, it was drawn
into efforts to achieve retroactive justice for the bloody Kwangju incident of the Chun
regime. Many believe that President Kim Young-sam, who in 1992 became the first civilian
to assume the Presidency, had agreed not to pursue claims against his predecessors, the
Generals Roh Tae-woo and Chun Doo-hwan, as part of the deal that allowed Kim to take
power and democratization to proceed. Early in Kim's term, prosecutors had investigated
the two generals and dropped all charges related to treason during the 1979 coup or the
deaths in the 1980 incident at Kwangju. Later, however, responding to public pressure and
seeking to deflect allegations of corruption, Kim changed his mind. The Constitutional
Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of special legislation, passed at Kim's
instigation, to facilitate prosecution even after the normal period of statutory limitations
had expired. In a carefully worded decision, the Court found that the legislation had been
passed after the expiry of the period of statutory limitations for the 1979 coup, but that
prosecutions for the Kwangju incident could proceed. The Court's analysis highlighted
Kim Young-sam's failure to take action against Chun and Roh early in his Presidency
when the statute of limitations would not have been an issue. Ultimately, both men were
found guilty, and subsequently pardoned at the instigation of President-elect Kim Daejung in December 1997.
The Court has been especially important in dealing with the legacies of the authoritarian
regime, particularly the National Security Act (NSA) and the Anti-Communist Act. These
laws were used to suppress independent political organizations by providing draconian
sanctions against dissenters and loosely-defined illegal associations. The laws were
therefore a target of human rights activists and regime opponents. The statutes operated
by carving out exceptions to normal requirements of criminal procedure. For example,
Article 19 of the NSA allowed longer pre-trial detention for those accused of particular
crimes, and this was struck by the Constitutional Court in 1992 as a violation of the right
to a speedy trial. The Court also found that a clause criminalizing anyone who "praises,
encourages, or sympathizes with the activities of an anti-state organization or its members,
or .

.

. by any means whatever benefits an anti-state organization" to be vague and

overbroad, and to threaten constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and speech,
freedom of academic study, and freedom of conscience. The Court did not strike the NSA,
but rather sought to limit and channel its application to constitutional purposes.
Perhaps the greatest political controversy the Court has had to deal with was the
impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun, an activist labor lawyer who took office in 2003
with a reformist agenda. 20 Roh faced a hostile National Assembly, and was soon beset by a
split in his party and a corruption scandal related to campaign contributions that erupted

19 Ahn, ibid.

See generally Lee, YJ (2005) 'Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Impeachment of Roh Moo-Hyun from a
Comparative Constitutional Perspective' 53 American Journal of Comparative Law 403.
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in October. Roh staked his future on a mid-term legislative election, but-in violation of
South Korean law-appeared to campaign for his own party by urging voters to support
it. The majority in the National Assembly responded with a motion for impeachment
which passed by the necessary 2/3 vote.
Under Korean law, Roh was suspended from office and the Prime Minister assumed
the duties of the President. The case was then sent to the Constitutional Court for
confirmation, as required under the Constitution. During the deliberations of the case,
however, the mid-term election was held and Roh's party received overwhelming support,
winning an absolute majority in the Assembly.
Perhaps responding to the public's preferences, the Constitutional Court rejected the
impeachment motion one month later. In addressing the issue, the Court bifurcated the
issue into the question of whether there was a "violation of the Constitution or other Acts,"
the predicate for impeachment, and whether those violations were severe enough to warrant
removal. Although the Court found that Roh had violated the election law provisions that
public officials remain neutral, along with other provisions of law, it decided that it would
not be proportional to remove the President for the violation. Instead, the Court asserted
that removal is only appropriate when the "free and democratic basic order" is threatened.
Roh's violations were not a premeditated attempt to undermine constitutional democracy.
The Court further rejected some of the charges, namely those concerned with campaign
contributions that took place before he took office.
In short, the Korean Constitutional Court has been playing a significant role in Korean
politics and society. It has become an important site of political contestation, as interest
groups have begun seeking to use the Court to achieve social change. The Court frequently
strikes legislative action and also regularly overturns prosecutorial decisions, particularly
important given the central role of prosecutors in the authoritarian period. At the same
time, the Court has trod on careful ground in those cases likely to lead to political backlash,
as in the impeachment case and in its handling of the National Security Act. At the time
of this writing, the Constitutional Court is the most popular government institution in
Korean society. 21
Thailand
The Thai Constitutional Court was established with the 1997 Constitution. This emerged
as part of a dramatic transition to democracy designed to break the cycle of coups and
political corruption that had plagued Thailand's history since the end of the absolute
monarchy in 1932. Depending on how one counts, Thailand had experienced between 17
and 19 coups, and had 16 different Constitutions during this period. 22 However, a coup in
1992 had provoked the ire of the middle class when protests were violently suppressed.
Pressure grew for the renewal of democracy, accelerating after the King intervened to
castigate the coup leaders. Ultimately the citizens' movement prevailed. The result was
the so-called "people's constitution," adopted after widespread public input and debate.
It was the first ever of Thailand's constitutions to include such input from the public.

21
22

JoongAng Daily, July 3, 2007, available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2877553
See the article by Harding and Leyland in this issue.
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Faced with the history of instability, and with an endemic form of electoral corruption
that had made civilian rule as ineffective as the military was illegitimate, the drafters of
the Thai Constitution focused on limiting governmental power. Academics played an
important role in the drafting process, as the drafting commission was led by Chulalongkorn
University Law Professor Bovornsak Uwanno. The Constitution emerged as a kind of
mega-constitution, with 336 articles covering over 100 pages of text. In part this reflected
the desire to specify rights in detail so as to avoid the possibility of mis-interpretation.
The Constitution had a number of radical features designed to increase participation
and accountability. First, it tried to decentralize power to the hitherto moribund local
governments. Second, it established extensive administrative rights to information, to sue
the government and receive reasons for adverse decisions by government. It introduced
elections for the upper body of parliament, the Senate, and made it into a non-partisan
body. It also created several new institutions to enhance participation and human rights
protection. Two powerful new independent bodies were set up to improve the political
process, an Election Commission and a National Counter-Corruption Commission
(NCCC). The former was designed to minimize the chronic problem of vote-buying; it had
the power to monitor elections, ban candidates and political parties, and order a re-run of
any election it deemed to have been fraudulent.' The NCCC collected reports on assets
from politicians and senior bureaucrats to ensure that there were no mysterious increases
during the time they were in public service. Those who failed to report assets could be
barred from office, subject to approval from the new Constitutional Court.
The new Constitutional Court was one of the key institutions designed to enhance
legality and check a Parliament traditionally seen as a hotbed of corruption and special
interest. It was to be a permanent body with 15 members appointed by the King upon
advice of the Senate for nine year non-renewable terms. Members had to be forty years
of age. In keeping with the need to secure various kinds of expertise in constitutional
interpretation, the body included a variety of qualifications and appointment mechanisms.
Cases could be referred to the Constitutional Court by ordinary courts in the course of
litigation; the presidents of each house of Parliament; the Prime Minister; and other
designated political bodies. As in Fifth Republic France, there was a provision for minority
groups of legislators to submit legislation before promulgation by the King, but no power
of direct petition from the public.
In addition, the Court exercised a wide array of ancillary powers. Besides the power
to confirm findings of and evaluate disclosures submitted to the Election Commission and
NCCC described above, the Court could, inter alia: review whether any appropriations
bill would lead to involvement of an elected official in the expenditure of funds (Section
180); determine whether an Emergency Decree is made in a real emergency (Section
219); determine whether Election Commissioners should be disqualified (Section 142);
and decide whether political party regulations violate the Constitution or fundamental
principles of Thai governance (Section 47). Because of the overarching concern with
corruption that animated the 1997 Constitution, the Court had the power to demand
documents or evidence to carry out its duties. In this sense it was a kind of inquisitorial
Constitutional Court. The Court's early history was mostly uneventful but it quickly

In the first Senate election in 2000, the Election Commission threw out 78 out of 200 election results because
of fraud.
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became embroiled in the politics surrounding billionaire populist Thaksin Shinawatra,
who became Prime Minister in 2001.
Just before the election won by his Thai Rak Thai Party, Thaksin was found by the
NCCC to have filed a false assets report. The Constitutional Court was called on the
confirm the finding, and was put in a difficult position. In a divided decision that has been
described as confused, the Court found that the false report hadn't been filed deliberately
and allowed Thaksin to take the post of Prime Minister. Thus began a long chapter in which
Thaksin used his money and influence to dominate Thai politics, undermining many of
the guardian institutions that were supposed to protect the constitutional scheme. 24 The
Court was tainted in some eyes for allowing Thaksin to take power, but on some occasions
did constrain him. For example, it ruled that a couple of appointments, including those
of Election Commissioner and the Auditor General, had not followed proper procedure. 25
Still, the general perception was that these offices did not function as they should have.
Following widespread allegations of electoral corruption in 2006, the Constitutional Court
found that a legal case against him was non-justiciable. 26
Frustrated with political institutions, opposition forces took to the streets. Thaksin
called a snap election for April 2006, but this was boycotted by the opposition, leading
to a constitutional crisis when too few members of Parliament could be seated. At this
point, on April 26, 2006, the King met with the leaders of the Constitutional, Supreme and
Administrative Courts and publicly called for them to resolve the constitutional crisis,
suggesting they should void the April election. The Constitutional Court responded by
annulling the election, and three election commissioners were jailed, on the grounds that
the time allowed for the election campaign had been too brief and that some polling booths
had been positioned to allow others to view the ballots as they were cast. Five new election
commissioners, who had just been chosen after months of deadlock, would be replaced.
Nevertheless, with political institutions at a standstill, the appointment process could
hardly operate. The Constitutional Court seemed to have failed to resolve the problem
completely. This is a paradigm example of the politicization of the judiciary that is a risk
for constitutions placing so much power in the hands of guardians.
Thaksin's domination of politics eventually provoked a reaction from the military
and in September 2006, he was replaced in a coup. Pointedly, the Interim Constitution
promulgated by the military disbanded the Constitutional Court, even though most of the
other guardian institutions were allowed to continue operating. In August 2007, a new
constitution was approved by referendum, and a new Constitutional Court established.
The new Court is a nine-member body, serving a single nine-year term selected in simpler
fashion by a selection committee.2 7
The Thai story is of a court that disappointed many of those who had high hopes in
it, yet it is not fully clear exactly what the court could have done to resist the billionaire
populist whose reach extended into virtually every institution in Thailand. If anything, the

24

Leyland, P (2007) 'Thailand's Constitutional Watchdogs: Dobermans, Bloodhounds or Lapdogs?' 2(2)

Journalof ComparativeLaw 151.
25 Leyland, ibid. at 159.
26

27

Leyland, ibid. at 168
Constitution of Thailand 2007, sections 200, 202.
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story cautions against expecting courts to be able to do too much, and to single-handedly
save a democratic system from itself.
Mongolia
The world's second communist country, Mongolia was governed for many years as a de
facto satellite of the Soviet Union. This changed only in 1989 when demonstrations led
by intellectuals led the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) to revise
the political system and allow for multi-party elections. After a brief period of transition,
these reforms were crystallized in the 1992 Constitution.
The Constitutional Court (called the Tsets from the traditional word for a judge in
Mongolian wrestling) was designed to supervise the Constitution. Although the drafters of
the Constitution briefly considered the institution of American-style decentralized judicial
review, the adoption of the Kelsenian centralized model was considered more compatible
with Mongolia's civil law tradition. The Court had nine members, three selected by each
of the President, the Parliament and the Supreme Court. Cases can be brought by ordinary
citizens through constitutional petition, as well as referral by various political institutions.
In its early years, the Court's primary role was in resolving competence disputes between
the powerful legislature and the directly elected President. The Court also responded to
citizen complaints and issued a number of decisions overturning government actions that
violated the constitutional text. However, the Court's own decision that the Constitution
did not give it jurisdiction over ordinary court decisions meant that certain areas important
for human rights protection, most notably criminal procedure, were outside its purview. 8
The Court has been somewhat hampered by a peculiar institutional design that allowed
the Parliament to reject initial findings of the Court. In the event the Parliament rejected the
decision, the Court could hear the case again en banc and issue a final, binding decision by
a two-thirds vote. This institutional design probably reflected residual socialist notions of
parliamentary sovereignty, as well as a similar scheme that existed in the Polish Constitution
before amendments in 1997. Although the Mongolian Court's early decisions were accepted
by the Parliament, the election of an overwhelming majority of MPRP to the Parliament in 1998
meant that the party had the easy ability to reject Court decisions as a matter of course.
This situation was exacerbated by a particular series of poorly considered decisions by
the Court on the shape of the political system. 29 Following the first election victory of the
opposition coalition in 1996, the Court decided that a constitutional clause that said "members
of parliament shall have no other employment" prevented the Government from forming the
cabinet out of sitting parliament members. This question went to the core of the nature of the
political system: was it a parliamentary system or a presidential one? The case produced a
series of institutional conflicts between the parliament and the Court. After the Court rejected
legislation passed to allow the government to be formed out of parliament as unconstitutional,
the parliament passed a series of constitutional amendments designed to remedy the defect.
These amendments were themselves rejected by the Court as unconstitutional. The crisis was
only resolved some five years later in 2001, when the Court finally backed down and allowed a

I Ginsburg, supra note 6, at ch. 6.
29 Ginsburg, T and Ganzorig, G (2001) 'When Courts and Politics Collide: Mongolia's Constitutional Crisis' 14
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second round of constitutional amendments to go forward. The story of the Mongolian Court
is thus one of poor decision-making that squandered institutional capital that had been built up
in the very first years of the institution.
Summary
These four cases illustrate a range of environments in which constitutional courts operate.
They include former communist regimes and former military regimes. They range
geographically and culturally. But all four courts are playing an important role in political
conflict, and with the somewhat strange exception of Mongolia, have by and large helped
to resolve these conflicts effectively. All the courts have played a role in underpinning and
facilitating democratization. The next sections consider some comparative questions in
light of these brief case studies.
UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The four courts under consideration exhibit a range of features. Yet all four reflect the
Kelsenian model of a centralized institution, paradigmatically embodied in the German
Constitutional Court, rather than the American decentralized model in which any court
can make a declaration of unconstitutionality. This choice of the continental model
was made despite substantial American influence on the law and politics of Korea and
Taiwan, and American advice into the Mongolian constitutional drafting process. In this
sense, courts in Asia are reflecting the dominant role of the continental model in all legal
systems except those subject directly or indirectly to British colonialism. In a global sense,
only a very few courts without British or American colonial experience have adopted a
decentralized model of judicial review.
The Table One on the next page summarizes several features of institutional design of
the four courts.
While the prestige of the German model may explain the decision to centralize review in
a single designated body, the details of institutional design are likely to reflect in large part
the political configuration during the time of constitutional drafting. Thus the appointment
mechanisms are most complex in Thailand, wherein drafters sought to insulate the justices
from politics by setting up an intricate array of appointment mechanisms and committees.
Although many American states and several countries use mixed committees to appoint
ordinary judges, the Thai scheme is particularly byzantine and reflects the importance of
various professional factions in the drafting process. In Taiwan, in contrast, the drafting
of the constitutional text in 1947 reflected the dominance of Chiang Kai-shek in the KMT.
The President plays the major role in appointing the Grand Justices, a desirable feature for
a powerful figure certain to win the Presidency.
Mongolia and Korea utilize the Italian model of representative appointments by each
of three political branches. This representative model may be desirable when parties
are uncertain of their position in government after the constitution is adopted. Whereas
Chiang Kai-shek knew he would be able to appoint the Grand Justices and was happy to
keep the power centralized in the Presidency, situations of greater political uncertainty are
likely to lead drafters to ensure wide representation on the court. 0 When each institution

so Ginsburg, (2003), supra note 6.
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appoints a third of the members, no institution can dominate the court. Mongolia and
Korea utilize the Italian model of representative appointments by each of three political
branches. This representative model may be desirable when parties are uncertain of
their position in government after the constitution is adopted. Whereas Chiang Kai-shek
knew he would be able to appoint the Grand Justices and was happy to keep the power
centralized in the Presidency, situations of greater political uncertainty are likely to lead
drafters to ensure wide representation on the court.31 When each institution appoints a
third of the members, no institution can dominate the court.
Table 1: Features of Institutional Design
Thailand

Korea

Taiwan

Mongolia

date of establishment

1997-2006

1989

1947; as modified by constitutional amendments

1992

# members

15

9

15

9

How appointed

7 elected by top
courts; 8 selected by
a mixed commission as qualified in
law and political
science; confirmed
by Senate

3 each from
Court, President
and National
Assembly

By President
with approval
by the National
Assembly

3 each from President, Parliament
and Supreme
Court

Term length in
years

9

6

8

6

Terms renewable?

No

Yes

No

Yes

Constitutional
petitions from
public?

No

Yes

No

Yes

Abstract/concrete
review

Both

Concrete

Abstract but includes referrals
from ordinary
courts

Both

Review of legislation ex post/ ex
ante

Both

Ex post

Ex post

Ex post

Decisions final?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Initial decisions
can be rejected by
the legislature, but
subsequently confirmed by en banc
sitting of court

Important ancillary powers

Overseeing corruption and electoral
commissions

Impeachment,
dissolution of
political party

Declare political
parties unconstitutional

Impeachment,
overseeing electoral commission

1
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This dynamic is best illustrated in Korea, where the Constitution was drafted behind
closed doors by three factions with roughly equal political support.32 Situations of such
uncertainty mean that each faction believes it is likely to be out of power. This may also
give the drafters the incentive to include the power of constitutional petition by citizens.
Constitutional petition guarantees that political losers will have access to the constitutional
court in the event the winners trample their rights.
Another issue in constitutional court design is that of term length. It is usually
suggested that longer terms are likely to lead to more independent adjudication. There
seems to be a tradeoff in our four cases between short renewable terms (Korea and
Mongolia) and longer non-renewable terms (Thailand and Taiwan). While this does not
reflect any apparent political pattern, it is interesting that the shift to non-renewable terms
in Taiwan only took place after democratization began in earnest; in the one-party period
it may have been politically useful for the KMT to wield the threat of non-reappointment
over the Grand Justices.
This illustrates that dominant party regimes may be in a better position to hinder strong
review power in constitutional design. Strong parties that believe they are likely to control
the legislature are likely to want weaker courts. In both Mongolia and Taiwan, strong
party regimes built in controls over the court in the design process: in Mongolia through
the anomalous institution of parliamentary approval of initial decisions by the court on
constitutionality, and in Taiwan, through the centralized appointment mechanism. The
more diffuse political environments of Thailand and Korea, wherein multiple political
parties were competing for power, may have contributed to more powerful court design.
Other features of institutional design reflected political concerns associated with
particular circumstances. Examples include the emphasis on anti-corruption and the
mechanism of abstract pre-promulgation review of legislation in the Thai Constitutional
Court design. These features both reflect the overarching distrust of partisan politics in
Thailand. As the French experience has shown, abstract pre-promulgation review tends to
lead to the insertion of the constitutional court into the legislative process.33
In short, institutional design of constitutional courts should be understood as reflecting
a process of adapting foreign models with local institutional needs. This account suggests
that political considerations play an important role in understanding court design in Asia
and elsewhere.
UNDERSTANDING COURT PERFORMANCE
What about the performance of these constitutional courts? What roles are they playing?
While of course each court presents its own story in a distinct political social and cultural
context, several broad themes emerge from the regional snapshots provided above.
First, constitutional courts have been useful in striking, one at a time, elements of the
old system. They served as consolidators of democracy, rather than the bodies triggering

32 Other institutions of the 1987 Constitution, including the single term Presidency, reflect the uncertainty that

any one of these three factions would win the first election. The single term has allowed the presidency to be
rotated by the three major political figures involved in the drafting-Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, and Kim
Dae-jung.
* Stone, A (1992) The Birth ofJudicial Politicsin France Oxford University Press.
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the process. This function was particularly important in the relatively gradual transitions
from authoritarian rule in Taiwan and Korea. In Thailand, the military regime was not
systematically entrenched in the society, having been in power only a short time and
reflecting the less pervasive character of the Thai state in controlling the ordinary lives of
its citizens. The primary threat to democracy was seen to be the corrupt political process
itself, and the constitutional text reflected that concern. In Mongolia, the Court played less
of a rights-protecting role than in Korea and Taiwan; this may have been appropriate since
the complete break with the past marked by the transition from socialism meant that by
definition the old regime was less intact.
Second, ancillary powers of constitutional courts are important, though they have
received relatively little scholarly attention in Asia and elsewhere. In Thailand, for
example, cases involving constitutional review of legislation were not nearly as important
as the Court's role in supervising the electoral process.3 4 The most prominent case in
Korea's constitutional history was an impeachment case-far from the exercise of judicial
review as classically defined. Giving the Council of Grand Justices on Taiwan the ability
to declare political parties unconstitutional marked a major step in ensuring that such
declarations would be conceived of in legal rather than political terms, and reflected a shift
toward the rule of law.
Third, all four of the constitutional courts have been involved in issues related to the
composition of government. In Thailand, the high profile cases involving Prime Minister
Thaksin are the best examples; in Taiwan and Korea the courts adjudicated interim
appointments of the Prime Minister by a President in a split executive system, and the
Korean impeachment also involved government composition in one sense. The Mongolian
Constitutional Court was called on to determine the fundamental character of the political
regime as parliamentary or presidential. In all these cases, the transfer of political struggle
from the streets to the courtroom is a significant step. Regardless of the outcome, the
fact that political forces have an alternative place to resolve core questions may facilitate
democratic consolidation.
These types of disputes, however, place constitutional courts in difficult positions in
that they are called on to wield expertise that they may not have, and may have to substitute
for more democratic processes. One need only consider the reaction to the United States
Supreme Court's system in Bush v. GoreY to understand the perils associated with these
kinds of decisions. Arguably the Korean and Taiwanese courts took the best approach by
ducking the issue and letting the political process decide the outcome. In Thailand, the
Court could not avoid the issue, but in the end it took a similar approach by deferring to
the democratic majority that had elected Thaksin despite reports of his failure to file a
complete declaration of assets with the NCCC. In contrast, the Mongolian Court derailed
the entire constitutional system by refusing to allow the newly elected majority to form a
government of its choosing. This led to a severe conflict with the political branches and
the depletion of the court's authority. The lesson then, is one of caution on core issues of
the political process for courts in new democracies.
This leaves attention to fundamental rights and constraint of state authority as the
real roles the courts can play. Here the Courts of Korea and Taiwan have been active in
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introducing international norms into new contexts, with both courts forcing significant
reforms in criminal procedure. The Mongolian Court also played such a role, at least early
in the post-socialist period. Given the less severe character of Thai criminal justice even
under the military government, it is perhaps understandable that the court has not yet
emerged as a major voice in this area.
This discussion has implicitly assumed that courts are strategic actors. Courts make
choices as to what cases to hear and how to handle them. Because judicial behavior
and motivation in general is so poorly understood, it is difficult to develop predictive
conclusions about how courts will act in particular cases.3 6 What we can conclude, however,
is that variations in performance may also be affected by broader cultural, political and
social factors. The next section considers some of these.
EXPLAINING THE EMERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
What are the implications of this story for broader comparative understanding of the
emergence of constitutional review? Because the adoption of constitutional review
is intimately bound up in the broader phenomena of global political liberalization and
expansion of judicial power, it implicates issues much larger than can be resolved here.
However, we will use these four cases to draw some conclusions on factors that might be
relevant to the conditions for the successful emergence of constitutional review.
Cultural traditions are sometimes seen to provide important supporting conditions
for the exercise of legal authority. From this perspective, judicial review is the ultimate
expression of a tradition of autonomous law associated with the modern West. The four
environments considered here have no cultural tradition of autonomous law. The robust
exercise of judicial power in all settings helps to confirm that cultural factors are not
insurmountable obstacles to judicial review. We need not rehash the entire debate over
"Asian values" except to note that, too often, those arguing for Asian exceptionalism reason
backward from the existence of illiberal regimes to the values that allegedly support those
regimes. At a minimum, we can conclude that the existence of non-Western values at one
point in history is not an insurmountable barrier to the later emergence of constitutional
constraints on politicians.
One factor that might be called cultural concerns the receptivity of the society to foreign
ideas, a factor particularly important in an era of "globalization". All four examples
considered here are drawn from small countries. Three of them have historically been
subject to Western influence while a fourth, Mongolia, has recently turned to the West as a
counterweight to Chinese and Russian influence. Such small countries may be particularly
open to influence from the modern West because of their fear of cultural and political
domination by more proximate large states. Judicial review from this point of view is
one element of a package of modernizing reforms that are adopted because of their very
western-ness, as part of a complex security strategy.
"Westernization" gives the West a stake in the society, and hence may deter the large
neighbor from expansionism. Because all four of our case studies share this attribute
of smallness, we cannot draw firm conclusions about the relevance of this factor for
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the adoption and development of judicial review. However, we can say that Western
influence did not determine institutional form. For Taiwan and Korea, the United States
provided a reference society that influenced institutional and systemic changes during the
long authoritarian period. Yet neither country has adopted the decentralized system of
judicial review. Institutional design appears to be an issue where local, not international,
forces are determinative.
One might also expect that priorhistory of judicial review would provide an important
source of support for constitutional judges in new democracies. After all, it is generally
hypothesized that democratization has been easier in those countries where authoritarian
regimes had displaced prior democracies. History, the argument runs, provides a source of
inspiration as well as models of institutional design for new democracies." In the Eastern
European context, for example, the inter-war history of democracy in Czechoslovakia and
Hungary are thought to support the more rapid democratization of those countries than
the ambivalent cases of Rumania and Bulgaria.38
Yet prior experience can constrain as well as inspire. In particular, when an institution
exists under authoritarianism, it may develop an institutional culture that favors restraint.
Further, it is unlikely to be seen as legitimate in the very early years of democratization.
In the case of Taiwan, the Grand Justices existed under the authoritarian regime, and this
may have hindered rather than supported the emergence of a more activist conception of
judicial review. The Council of Grand Justices in Taiwan was quite cautious in building
up its power, treading very carefully, in part because its legacy complicated the task of
identifying core constituencies. Even its most famous decision, forcing the retirement in
1990 of the legislators who had been elected on the mainland decades earlier, is perhaps
best understood as siding with one ascendant faction of the KMT over another, and not
truly about the constraint of power. The Korean and Mongolian Constitutional Courts, as
new institutions, had a bit more freedom to operate. In Thailand, formal provision for the
exercise of judicial review in earlier constitutions lay dormant. This suggests that prior
history is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the successful functioning of a
particular constitutional court.
Some scholars have attempted to tie the exercise of judicial power to the type of
previous regime, with a peculiar threat posed by military authoritarians.3 1 Our cases
provide counter-evidence to the assertion that military authoritarian regimes hinder the
development of judicial review. The Korean Constitutional Court has developed active
judicial review in the shadow of a departing military-authoritarian regime. Thailand's
1997 Constitution, embodied in the Constitutional Court itself, was designed in part to
secure the permanent removal of the military from politics. Taiwan's Council of Grand
Justices has also systematically dismantled the military-Leninist system of control of civil
society. It may be helpful that the only tool the military has to influence the court is
to overturn the entire constitutional order, the political equivalent of a nuclear warhead;
civilian political parties and institutions have more subtle ways of engaging with the court
to communicate their preferences and to encourage judicial modesty. Paradoxically, this
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means military regimes may actually be associated with judicial autonomy - after all, both
officers and judges see themselves as professionals insulated from the dirty politics of
legislatures and parties.
The pace oftransition,in particular the timing of constitutional reform, may affect the exercise
of judicial review. In Korea, as well as Mongolia and Thailand, constitutional reform was
accomplished quickly at the outset of the transition process (though other democratic reforms
were gradual in Korea). This provided the courts with an identifiable constitutional moment to
invoke. Where constitutional reform is a gradual process, as in Taiwan, the court must fear the
real possibility of constitutional override of any unpopular decisions and therefore will likely
be more cautious. Further research on other countries is necessary to evaluate this hypothesis,
but our cases suggest that quick transition can support judicial review.
Ackerman (1997) has suggested that strong presidencies are helpful for the exercise of
judicial review.t In this regard, one might add that the adoption of a French-style split
executive creates a need for independent courts to arbitrate institutional disputes. Three
of our countries have such split executive systems, while Thailand relies on a traditional
parliamentary structure of government. Korea and Taiwan were both more strongly
weighted toward presidential power than the weak semi-presidential system in Mongolia.
Probably more important is the type of party system. The party system is the crucial
factor that determines how the institutions interact, not the mere fact of presidentialism. If
a single dominant party exists and controls the legislature and executive, inter-institutional
conflict is likely to be minimal. Where divided government holds, however, institutional
conflicts will provide the court with a role to play and more policy space in which to
render decisions. Split executive systems often produce divided government, and Korea
and Taiwan, the two cases with arguably the most robust exercise of judicial review, both
had periods of divided government in the 1990s. In Mongolia, the Court's challenge of
an overwhelming parliamentary majority after 1998 put it into a battle it could not win;
ultimately it had to capitulate.
Certain other variables may affect demand for judicial review by creating incentives
for plaintiffs to bring cases to courts. In particular, a vigorous civil society provides
interest groups that may seek to challenge government action in courts. 4 1 Furthermore,
an unrestricted legal profession may create incentives for individual lawyers to act as
entrepreneurs by pursuing constitutional litigation. These two demand-side variables
would support plaintiffs' propensity to bring constitutional cases. Charles Epp has argued
that these are necessary underpinnings for a "rights revolution."'
On both of these scores, Korea provides counterevidence to the hypothesis. In contrast
with Taiwan and Mongolia, associational life has been limited in Korea.t While certain
types of private associations exist, for the most part these are not focused on public-interest
issues of the type that would lead to greater demand for judicial review. If anything, the
presence of an increasingly active system of judicial review has encouraged the formation
of new interest groups, suggesting that the causal relationship runs in the opposite
direction. Similarly, Korea and to a lesser extent Taiwan have historically placed significant
restrictions on the practice of law, limiting entry into the profession to a greater extent than
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Thailand. This should dampen demand for judicial review. But Korea's activist system
of judicial review existed and thrived prior to recent efforts to liberalize the profession.
More broadly, however, the emergence of a middle class, seen to be so important in the
broader process of democratization, may be a necessary condition for constitutional review
to thrive. All four countries can be said to have vigorous middle classes that played an
important role in demanding democratic reforms." The presence of this broader middle
class allows the court to have an alternative means of legitimation -the court can protect
itself from attack by political institutions through building up a wellspring of popular
support. Of course, such a move requires the court to take a particular strategy in choosing
cases of most interest to the middle class and their rights-claims. The Mongolian Court
notably declined to do this, and found itself without much public support when it became
embroiled in conflicts with the parliament and government. In contrast, Korean and
Taiwan societies have seen the development of some interest groups that seek to advance
their causes through litigation. Such groups by definition have a stake in the Court's
continued independence and vitality.
Table Two summarizes some of the possible explanatory variables discussed here.
The obvious conclusion is that constitutional courts can emerge and thrive in a variety
of environments. Even the rather odd Mongolian case should not be generalized to
other post-socialist contexts, for some such courts have been very effective at building up
effective support and constraining their politicians. The Hungarian case is perhaps best
known in this regard.
Table 2: Explanatory Variables
Thailand

Korea

Taiwan

Mongolia

Confucian cultural
tradition

No

Yes

Somewhat

No

colonialism

None

Japanese

Japanese

Russian

previous judicial
review?

Minimal

Yes

Yes

No

previous democracy?

Yes

Yes

No

No

type of previous
regime

Military

Military

Dominant Leninist
party

Dominant Leninist
party

type of transition

Quick

Quick

Gradual

Quick

governmental
structure

Parliamentary

Semi-presidential

Semi-presidential

Semi-presidential

divided government?

No

Yes

Yes

No

middle class?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes*

capitalist economy?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

History of authoritarian pluralism

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
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CONCLUSION
In recent decades, judicial review has expanded around the globe from the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan to become a regular feature of constitutional design in Africa
and Asia. Constitutional courts have exercised review to challenge political authorities
when conflicts arise among government institutions or governments impinge on individual
rights. Although the formal power to exercise judicial review is now nearly universal in
democratic states, courts have varied in the extent to which they are willing to exercise this
power in practice.
The four courts described above all emerged as major political actors as part of the
democratization process. We draw four main conclusions from this account of the
Asian cases. First, these cases highlight the important role of constitutional courts in
mediating the political process, sometimes by using powers ancillary to the primary,
high-profile function of reviewing legislation for constitutionality. Here the existence
of the constitutional court can facilitate institutional dialogues among political actors,
encouraging peaceful resolution of political disputes and facilitating consolidation.
Second, the emergence of constitutional review in Asia suggests that supposed cultural
barriers to the emergence of constitutional constraint are no longer operative, if they ever
were so. Third, although a wide variety of social contexts can support constitutional
review, the existence of a middle class appears to be an important factor in creating a
bulwark of support for constitutional courts.
Fourth, it seems that political diffusion matters. Dominant parties are less likely
to design open and powerful systems of judicial review, and are less likely to tolerate
powerful courts exercising independent power once the constitution enters into force. In
contrast, constitutional design in a situation of political deadlock is more likely to produce a
strong, accessible system of judicial review as politicians seek political insurance. Political
diffusion creates more disputes for courts to resolve, and hinders authorities from overruling or counter-attacking courts. In this sense, the emergence of powerful constitutional
courts in Asia reflects democratization, and is not counter-democratic as has been argued
in the U.S. context.
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